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Differences in Rates of Return to Education: Immigrant and Native Men in 1980's
Abstract
The past two decades have seen the debate over immigration policy revived by changes in three main
indicators. First, the number of immigrants entering the US increased from (roughly) 3.3 million in the
whole of the 1960’s to 1 million per year in the 1990’s. Second, those that arrived after 1970 came with
considerably lower skills relative to comparable US natives than did previous cohorts of immigrants.
Finally, the wage differential between recently arriving immigrants and US natives widened considerably
from -16.6% in 1970 to -27.6% in 1980, and finally to -31.7% in 990 (Borjas 1994).
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Differences in Rates of Return to
Education: Immigrant and Native
Men in the 1980's
Grant Dodds
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing immigrant/native wage differenhe past two decades have seen the debate over
tial is best seen as the result of both demand and supimmigration policy revived by changes in
ply-side factors. Following Borjas (1985, 1995),
three main indicators. First, the number of
many economists claim that it derives from declining
immigrants entering the US increased from (roughly)
relative immigrant skill levels. At an important point
3.3 million in the whole of the 1960’s to 1 million per
in the analysis of recent immigrant performance, this
year in the 1990’s. Second, those that arrived after
assessment is appropriate. However, the complexity
1970 came with considerably lower skills relative to
of the wage determination process – by which human
comparable US natives than did previous cohorts of
capital and other skills and worker characteristics are
immigrants. Finally, the wage differential between
translated into wage rates in the labor market – disrecently arriving immigrants and US natives widened
courages any assessment that considers only one side
considerably from of the labor market.
16.6% in 1970 to Looking toward the
27.6% in 1980, and
demand side of
finally to -31.7% in “The performance of immigrants in the labor, evidence sug1990 (Borjas 1994). US labor market is increasingly relevant gests that while
These trends
major
changes
not
only
to
immigration
policy
relating
show that the peroccurred in the comformance of immi- to the rationing of visas ... but also to the position of immigrants in the US
grant labor supply, it
labor market performance of natives.” is also clear that the
labor market is
increasingly releemployment opporvant not only to
tunities available to
immigration policy
earlier generations of
relating to the rationing of visas, and laws pertaining
immigrants have been cut short for those arriving in
to illegal immigration, but also to the labor market
the past two or three decades. The assimilation sucperformance of natives. Chiswick (1978) notes that
cess experienced by generations that arrived prior to
changes in the skills of immigrants may alter the
the 1960’s occurred predominantly in a goods-proeffects of immigration on the level of income of the
ducing economy where seven out of every ten
native population and on the distribution of this
Americans were employed in either manufacturing,
income among groups defined by skill. The growing
agriculture, or mining (Waldinger, 1983). Such
number of immigrants in recent decades can be interemployment did not necessarily demand a college
preted as larger immigrant shares of the US work
education or computer skills to warrant a reliable,
force. The widening immigrant/native skills differenmiddle class salary.
tial suggests that the growing immigrant portion is
The engine driving the economy of the past
few decades is somewhat of a different model. By the
largely under-skilled relative to the US standard.

T
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early 1980’s, goods production furnished employposited in the first hypothesis. More specifically,
ment for only three out of every ten workers, and the
some economists (Berman et al, 1994) have cited
number of manufacturing jobs – at one point the most
observed growth in the relative demand for skilled
promising opportunity for incoming immigrants –
labor in the 1980’s as a likely cause of the larger
had remained virtually stagnant for much of the preincrease in the number of jobs requiring high skills
vious decade (Waldinger 1983), also see Berman et al
relative to those requiring low skills. It is possible
1994). LaLonde et al (1991) notes that wages and
that this higher relative demand for skilled labor is
employment prospects of less-skilled Americans
benefiting both groups.
have fallen dramatically at a time when new immiApplying human capital theory to immigrant
grants are entering the United States in the largest
assimilation, section II reviews the literature on
numbers in recent history. Additional evidence of the
declining relative immigrant skill levels and declinchanges occurring in US employment opportunities
ing relative immigrant wages between 1970 and
is the post-1979 proliferation of low-wage employ1990. Also, section II observes changes in the rates of
ment in the service sector (see Bluestone et al 1988).
return to different levels of education experienced by
While natives and immigrants are bringing
all male workers and the changing labor market condifferent levels of education to the labor market, it is
ditions that occurred over the same period. Section III
possible that these changing opportunities for US
explains the data and empirical model used to estiemployment are affecting the rates of return to the
mate the rates of return to education experienced by
determinants of both immigrant and native income.
immigrants and natives in 1980 and 1990. Since the
Since the most
real argument regardpopular explanaing these differences
tion for the relain rates of return lies
“Upon
arrival,
immigrants
will
accept
tively poor labor
in their interpretamarket performlower wages in the short run in order to tion, section IV
ance of immidelivers the results
make
investments
in
human
capital
that
grants after the
and then attempts to
1970’s is their
hold the promise of higher wages in the make sense of them
relatively lower
with
traditional
long run.”
level of skills,
explanations. Section
our
analysis
V gives concluding
focuses on the
remarks,
policy
different rates of
implications and sugreturn that immigrants and natives experienced for
gestions for further research.
three different levels of education in 1980 and 1990.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETIThe purpose of the paper is to assess the possible
CAL FRAMEWORK
causes of any differences between immigrant and
native rates of return to education.
A. Human Capital Theory and the Assimilation of
It is the main hypothesis that after controlling
Immigrants
for other forms of human capital and additional worker characteristics, native workers experienced greater
Through much of the 1980’s and early 1990’s,
rates of return to the attainment of 12 years, 14 years
most of what was considered common place econom(some college) and 16 years (college degree) of eduic theory regarding the integration of human capital
cation respectively in 1980 and in 1990. Additionally,
theory and immigrant assimilation came from the
it is hypothesized that the rates of return to all three
work of Barry Chiswick. With it we assume that
levels of education grew between 1980 and 1990 for
those choosing to bear the risks and costs associated
both groups, and that they grew the most for 16 years
with migration to the US do so with two incentives.
(college degree) of education. This second hypothesis
First, they have an incentive to leave their source
is intended to show growth rates in immigrant and
country. Second, they have an incentive to migrate
native returns to education that might provide incight
specifically to the United States. Once in the US such
into the determinants of the rate-of-return differences
immigrants may make investments in the kind of
68
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human capital that will translate into higher wages.
Both Chiswick (1978) and Carliner (1980)
defend this notion that the ability and determination
necessary to follow through with the decision to
immigrate encourages immigrants to expand their
stock of US human capital. Their theory asserts that
upon arrival immigrants will accept lower wages in
the short run in order to make the investments in
human capital that hold the promise of higher wages
in the long run. Chiswick (1978) estimated this period of investment and assimilation at roughly 10-15
years, after which the wages of most immigrants are
said to converge on – and some to overtake – those of
natives. For this to happen, immigrants must show
higher rates of return to additional years of US work
experience than natives; at least for the first 10-15
years. This representation of the assimilation process
puts immigrant performance in the US labor market
under a very positive light. The figures given by
Chiswick (1978), Carliner (1980) and Borjas (1985,
1995) estimating wage trends for immigrant groups
relative to natives show that up until the arrivals of
the early 1970’s, this depiction was a fairly accurate
portrayal of immigrant performance.
As Borjas (1985) argues, the theory becomes
too optimistic when applied to the immigrant cohorts
arriving after 1970 largely due to the effects of the
1965 amendments to US immigration policy. These
policy changes reshaped the national origins mix of
incoming immigrants from one largely composed of
developed, industrialized countries to one dominated
by less-developed countries. Before 1965, close to
68% of immigrant inflows came from Europe or
Canada. Asian countries contributed (roughly) 6%
while Mexico and other Latin American countries
delivered 15%. In the 1990’s European and Canadian
inflows were down to 16% while Latin American
countries (including Mexico) contributed 50%; Asian
inflows were up to 32% (Borjas 1994). Borjas shows
that these alterations in the major source countries,
coupled with the volatile political and economic conditions in some of them, allow us to conceptualize the
mechanism that increased the immigrant inflow and
simultaneously decreased its average skill levels relative to US natives.
Assuming these trends persist for new immigrant inflows, Borjas (1985, 1995) estimated that the
growing skill disparity between immigrants and
natives would keep many of the post-1975 arrivals
from reaching wage parity with natives. What Borjas’

cohort analysis shows is that while most immigrants
of varying skill levels experience some positive percentage growth in wages from the time they arrive in
the US to the time they retire, each successive wave
of new immigrants from the early 1970’s onward has
shown successive declines in arrival wages. While
the 1965-69 arrivals reduced their wage disparity
with natives from earning 18.1% less in 1970 to earning 1.1% more in 1990, the 1975-79 arrivals started
with an even greater disparity in 1980 (-32.2%)
(Borjas 1995). The arrival wage gap was even worse
in 1990 for the 1985-89 arrivals (-38.1%). While the
within-cohort growth of wages for each group averages out to an 8-10% improvement after 10 years of
experience in the US labor market, the across-cohort
growth shows steadily worsening arrival wages for
immigrants. Adding this assessment to the observed
growth in the immigrant/native skills disparity suggests that greater wage inequality after 1970 resulted
predominantly from declining relative immigrant
skills.
As was mentioned earlier, this is very much a
supply-side assessment of the wage gap. A closer
look at the growing skills differential between immigrants and natives shows that while much of the
attention is focused on “declining relative skills of
immigrants”, the skill levels of the entire immigrant
workforce have improved; an observation endorsed
by Lalonde et al (1991). Observing the 1970’s, they
note that the average (relative) “quality” of new
immigrants declined during the decade, even though
average school levels suggest no decline in quality
within immigrant groups (LaLonde et al 1990). From
1970 to 1990, the entire immigrant workforce
reduced its percentage of high school dropouts from
48% to 37% and increased its percentage of college
graduates from 19% to 26.6% (Borjas 1994).
These figures show that while recently arriving immigrants may possess fewer skills relative to
natives, the immigrant workforce taken as a whole
experienced steady improvement. The greatest
changes, in fact, occurred in the skill attainment of
natives. From 1970 to 1990, native working men
decreased their percentage of high school dropouts
from 39.6% to 15% and increased their percentage of
college graduates from 15.4% to 26.6%. These trends
do reflect a growing skill disparity between immigrants and natives, but one that is more accurately
characterized by a greater relative skill accumulation
by native workers in the 20 year period.
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B. Changing Labor Market
Conditions and the Returns to
Table 1
Education
Percentage Change in Labor Supply by Years of Education
Theoretically, the educaYrs. of Completed
Percentage Change
Percentage Change
tional improvements for both
Age
Education
1971
-1979
1979 -1987
groups translate into a growing
25-34
12
+ 13.11
+ 40.23
supply of educated workers in
16
+ 84.95
+ 32.23
the labor market; but the bulk of 35-44
12
+ 12.36
+ 29.02
16
+ 29.26
+ 102.10
this increase – as the skill dis45-54
12
5.45
+
13.75
parity shows – is coming from
16
+ 24.07
+ 26.90
the
native
labor
force.
manufacturing industries in the 1980’s shows that this
Momentarily ignoring the immigrant/native distincdid not happen. Levy et al (1992) observe that while
tion in order to observe labor supply changes by eduthe number of 25-34 year old male high school gradcational attainment for different age groups of US
uates employed in manufacturing increased by 6%
workers, Table 1 shows that between 1971 and 1979
between 1979 and 1987, the number of male college
the two largest age groups in the male labor force
graduates employed in manufacturing increased by
(aged 25-34 and 35-44) increased their share of high
34%. This inability to substitute low-skilled labor for
school graduates by 13% and 12.36% and their shares
high-skilled labor increases the rate of return to highof college graduates by 85% and 29.26%. Between
er levels of education.
1979 and 1987, these age groups had 40% and 29%
Berman et al (1994) also observe a shift in the
more high school graduates and 32% and 102% more
skill content of the labor force employed by manufaccollege graduates (Levy et al 1992).
turing industries during the 1980’s. Between 1979
These dramatic changes in labor supply must
and 1989 the employment of production (low-skilled)
have produced diverse effects both generally on earnworkers in US manufacturing dropped by 15 percent
ings and specifically on the earnings premium associfrom 14.5 million to 12.3 million, while non-producated with education. Now, competitive wage theory
tion (skilled) employment rose 3 percent from 6.5
asserts that in the event of constant demand for
million to 6.7 million (Berman et al 1994). They note
skilled and unskilled labor, wage fluctuations will
further that with this increase in the non-production
result from changes in the relative supply of skilled
(skilled) share of manufacturing employment, the reland unskilled labor. An increase in the supply of colative wages of non-production workers also
lege-educated labor would have the effect of decreasincreased. The simultaneous increase of employment
ing the rate of return to a college degree. Surveying
shares and wage rates for a particular group of workthe literature on US earnings levels and earnings
ers strongly suggests an increased demand for the
inequality, Levy et al (1992) conclude that the 85%
labor provided by that group. If this explanation
increase in the supply of college educated workers
accurately portrays manufacturing industries in the
[aged 25-34] was the single most important factor
late 1970’s and 1980’s, then college-educated workcontributing to a noticeable reduction in the earnings
ers experienced higher demand for their labor, which
premium associated with a college education in the
causes an increase in their rate of return to education.
1970’s.
The question remains where to put the workHowever, in spite of an additional 32% [aged
ing immigrant in this assessment. First of all, the shift
25-34] and 102% [aged 35-44] of college educated
in labor demand towards skilled workers in the
workers between 1979 and 1987, college graduates
1980’s affected most the manufacturing industries
experienced higher rates of return to their education
which provided the best employment opportunities
over the 1980’s. This created a considerable disparity
for incoming immigrants prior to the 1970’s. Also,
in the costs of employing high school and college
pairing Borjas’ observation of declining relative
graduates. If firms with a non-specific demand for
immigrant wages with the fact that larger numbers of
labor experience such a difference in employment
incoming immigrants originated from countries with
costs, they should substitute the relatively cheaper
relatively less-developed education systems suggests
high school educated worker for the relatively more
not only that immigrants brought relatively lower levexpensive college educated worker. The evidence for
70
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els of education over the 1980’s, but also that the low
transferability of “less-developed” education reduced
their relative rates of return to similar levels of education. For these reasons we test the following two
hypotheses: (1) After controlling for other forms of
human capital and additional worker characteristics,
native workers experienced greater rates of return to
the attainment of 12 years, 14 years (some college)
and 16 years (college degree) of education respectively in 1980 and in 1990. (2) The rates of return to
all three levels of education grew between 1980 and
1990 for both groups, but they grew the most for 16
years (college degree) of education.
III. DATA AND EMPIRCAL MODEL
The data used in this model come from pooled
cross-sections of 1980 and 1990 population-representative 1% samples both extracted from IPUMS
(Ruggles, et al). They consist of earnings (pre-tax
wage and salary income) for immigrant and native
males between 25 years and 65 years of age in the full
calendar year preceding each census. Earnings are
expressed in contemporary dollars and top-coded at
$75,000 in 1970 and $140,000 in 1990. Cases of $0
earnings were excluded. The remaining samples consist of 30,629 immigrants and 402,650 natives in
1980, and 52,733 immigrants and 460,164 natives in
1990.
The purpose of the research design is to estimate the rates of return to different levels of education for immigrants and natives in both sample years.
To do this earnings functions are developed for
natives and immigrants for 1980 and 1990. The use of
OLS regression in analyzing these earnings functions
will provide the means of testing our hypotheses. The
independent variables include three dummy variables
for each level of education and control variables for
other forms of human capital and worker characteristics. Abbreviated forms of the earnings functions are
as follows:
θN’EngSkN +
(1) ln(WN) = αN + βN’EducN +θ
δN’WCN + εN
θi’EngSki + δi’WCi +
(2) ln(Wi) = αi + βi’Educi +θ
γi’Immi + εi
where:
ln(Wi)= natural logarithm of wage and salary
income of the ith worker

αi = constant
βi’ = vector of coefficients (3) for different
education levels
Educi = vector of dummy variables (3) for
different education levels
θi’ = vector of coefficients (3) for English
proficiency
EngSki = vector of dummy variables (3)
for English proficiency
δi’ = vector of coefficients (5) for various
worker characteristics
WCi = vector of variables (5) for worker
characteristics
γi’ = vector of coefficients (3) for immigrantspecific characteristics
Immi = vector of variables for immigrantspecific characteristics
εi = disturbance term
Of primary concern are the coefficients for different education levels. I created 4 dummy variables
according to estimated years of acquired education.
The first variable, CEduc, measures whether a worker has a Bachelor’s degree or more (16 or more years
of education). The second, SCEduc, measures
whether a worker has any college experience (1 to 3
years), and HSEduc stands for workers who have
either acquired a high school diploma, a GED, or
simply finished a 12th year of school. The omitted
group (LEduc) consists of those with less than 12
years of education. Due to coding differences for the
two census years, the HSEduc variable is ambiguous
in distinguishing a high school diploma from a GED,
and from the completion of just 12 years of education. A more specific variable for high school graduates would have been more meaningful, however, the
data did not permit it. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for the variables in all four samples.
To estimate the number of years spent in the
US labor market I define a proxy for actual work
experience. The appropriate estimation of work experience hinges on the age at which the individual started work in the US, and it implicitly assumes that time
out of the labor market is not taken. Unfortunately,
samples meeting these strict requirements are not
available, so we estimate potential US work experience with the available data. For natives this estimation follows simply as:
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statisti cs for all Variables
1980
1990
Variables Immigrants Natives Immigrants
Natives
Definitions
Ln(Wi )
$16,257.40 $18 ,021.95 $27,104.95 $31,089.89
Income
Educi
CEduc
25.7%
23.3%
26.8%
25.9%
College degree (%)
SCEduc
15.1%
18.7%
20.4%
28.1%
Some college (%)
HSEduc
22.3%
35.1%
22.3%
33.7%
12 yrs. of educ. (%)
EngSki
EngW
24%
1.3%
23.1%
0.9% Speaks Eng. well (%)
EngNW
14.8%
4.0%
16.4%
0.3%
Not well (%)
EngNO
5.7%
0.0%
5.7%
0.0%
No English (%)
WCi
USExp
13.48
22.55
14.57
21.6
U.S. work experience
USExp^2
----Experience Squared
MS
76%
77.3%
66.7%
71.2%
Marital Statu s (%)
KID
1.37
1.18
1.24
1.0
# of children in house
HISP
33.5%
3.6%
43.6%
3.5% Hispanic Ethnicity (%)
SSEC
55 %
57.3%
59.5%
60.6%
Service Sector (%)
Immi
AgeMig
27.34
-25.63
-Age at Migration (yrs.)

(2)
USExp = Age – Educ – 6
where:
USExp
Age
Educ

= Potential experience in the US
labor market
= Age at the time of the census
= Years of education

The number 6 represents the estimated starting age of the education process. Obviously, not all
cases will follow this assumption. However, for
natives especially it is appropriate to assume that
enough cases will follow it to preserve the explanatory power of the variable. This proxy will suffice for
immigrant cases as well so long as the immigrant’s
arrival to the US precedes the last year of acquired
education. Where this is not the case (e.g., immigrants arriving in or after the last year of acquired
education), the following estimate is used instead:
(3)

USExpi = CenYr – YrImmigi
If: Age@Migi >/= Educi + 6
where:
USExpi
= Potential experience in the US
labor market
CenYr
= Census year
YrImmigi
= Estimated year of migration
Age@Migi = Estimated age upon migration to
the US
72

Educi
= Years of education
Since this estimate of US labor market experience
is measured continuously, the wide age interval used
in the samples necessitates the inclusion of a polynomial transformation of US work experience in the
earnings functions (USExp^2). This allows our estimate of earnings variation to accommodate the
diminishing returns to additional years of labor market experience. An important point is that for those
immigrants who arrived in the US after completing
their education, equation (3) is a measure of years
since migration; which allows the USExp variable to
capture – for many of the immigrant cases – the full
scope of wage effects resulting from the number of
years an immigrant has been in the US Now, for those
immigrants estimated to have arrived before finishing
school, the younger an immigrant happens to be at
migration the more the experience variable will strictly reflect time spent working in the US labor market
instead of total years since migration. To control for
the variation in earnings due to these cases of early
arrival to the US I include a continuous variable for
age at migration (AgeMig).
A vector of dummy variables measuring
English deficiency is also included in the earnings
function.
Language Classification
(1) Does not speak English
(2) yes, speaks English…
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(3) yes, speaks only English
(4) yes, speaks very well
(5) yes, speaks well
(6) yes, but not well

……….
……….
EngW
EngNW

Three variables were created from language groups
(1), (5), and (6) and a composite of (2), (3) and (4)
formed the omitted group. Since these variables identify those with a particular language deficiency, as
compared to speaking either very well or fluently, it
is expected that both groups in both census years will
experience negative returns to any language deficiency, and increasingly so with greater levels of deficiency.
A vector of control variables for additional
worker characteristics is also included in the model.
Marital status (MS) is one of these, and it identifies
married workers with their spouse present. Recent
observations of the declining shares of married men
in the labor force suggest that this measure will serve
as more than a control variable. Blackburn (1990)
estimates that the growth in the proportion of men in
the labor force who are unmarried (12.4% in 1967
and 25.4% in 1985) explains 15 percent of the
increase in within-group earnings inequality. While
not all economists share this view, it is prudent to
control for these changes and for how they might produce different effects for immigrant and native
wages. Along a similar line of reasoning, a continuous variable is added for the number of own children
still in the house (KID).
Another component of the vector of worker
characteristics controls for different rates of return to
having Hispanic ethnicity (HISP). The relevance of
this control variable has already been mentioned in
the form of rising Mexican and Latino percentages of
the new generations of immigrants since the 1970’s.
Since studies continue to show that racial discrimination maintains a real presence in the US labor market,
controlling for the largest ethnic share of both immigrant groups in the samples is appropriate for the
analysis. The dummy variable identifies workers of
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban or other Hispanic ethnicities.
The last variable in the vector of worker characteristics controls for different rates of return to
employment in the service sector. Bluestone et al
(1988) note for the early 1980’s that the low-wage
share of service sector employment is nearly 22 percent compared with [only] 12.4 percent in manufac-

turing and an overall 17.2 percent among all YRFT
workers. The dummy variable (SSEC) used here
indicates those working in the service sector instead
of the goods sector. It is expected that working in
services instead of goods production will have negative effects on the earnings of both groups in both
census years. The industry groups for each sector are
shown in Appendix A. Table 3 shows the predicted
signs for all variables in the earnings functions. The
main focus will be on the coefficients for the education variables. It is expected that natives received
higher rates of return to all three levels of education
in both years of observation; and that both groups
received higher rates of return to all three levels of
education in 1990, with the largest increase occurring
for the rates of return to a college degree. However,
the magnitude of these rate-of-return differences for
immigrant and native education will offer incite into
what determines them.
IV. REGRESSION RESULTS
Estimating the earnings functions for immigrants and natives using OLS regression in both years
of observation generates four sets of results as shown
in Table 4.
The table shows the coefficients corresponding to the
variables used with their T-statistics in parentheses.
Using the natural logarithm of wage and salary
income allows us to interpret the coefficients as the
percentage change in earnings in response to a one
unit increase in the independent variable. This means
that each coefficient represents the rate of return in

TABLE 3
Predicted Signs
Variables
Ln(Wi )
CEduc
SCEduc
HSEduc
USExp
USExp^2
EngW
EngNW
EngNO
MS
KID
HISP
SSEC
AgeMig

1980
Immigrants Natives
Dependent Dependent
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
--------+
+
+
+
------

1990
Immigrants
Natives
Dependent
Dependent
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
--------+
+
+
+
------

that year to an increase in a particular variable or
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viduals to leave the lessdeveloped source countries that have recently
1980
1990
dominated the national
Immigrants
Natives
Immigrants
Natives
origins mix have given
Constant 8.536 (325.878)** 8.351 (1371.036)** 9.005 (460.481)** 8.720 (1388.574)**
the new generations (after
CEduc
.519 (35.618)**
.729 (171.623)**
.725 (60.579)**
.939 (202.718)**
SCEduc
.242 (15.095)**
.448 (103.574)**
.358 (30.213)**
.551 (122.470)**
1970) of immigrants
HSEduc
.134 (9.706)**
.309 (84.343)**
.2 24 (20.512)**
.344 (80.407)**
lower quality (less-develUSExp
.0755 (30.878)**
.0538 (115.188)**
.0519 (36.708)**
.0521 (109.362)**
USExp2 -1.76E-3 (-23.501)** -9.23E-4 (-101.346)** -8.96E-4 (-25.597)** -9.22E-4 (-96.801)** oped) educations relative
EngW
-.126 (-10.063)**
-.125 (-10.368)**
-.130 (-13.549)**
-.195 (-14.237)** to US standards. This
EngNW
-.303 (-18.109)**
-.196 (-9.673)**
-.263 (-21.812)**
-.136 (-6.460)** effect would also transEngNO
-.391 (-15.927)**
-.423 (-7.367)**
-.403 (-21.962)**
-.220 (2.674)*
late empirically, in part,
MS
.281 (21.730)**
.353 (102.037)**
.305 (32.429)**
.355 (111.144)**
KID
.0148 (3.987)**
.0176 (15.466)**
.00540 (1.724)*
.020 (16.180)** as lower immigrant rates
HISP
-.128 (-10.827)**
-.103 (-13.909)**
-.161 (-18.595)** -.0938 (-13.636)** of return to Hispanic ethSSEC
-.131 (-13.090)** -.0933 (-35.371)**
-.0964 (-12.509)** -.0793 (-30.724)** nicity. However, since
AgeMig
.002 43 (4.714)**
-.00162 (4.091)**
-education is controlled
Adjusted R^2
.188
.145
.249
.178
for in the analysis, the
Sample Size
30,629
402,650
57,733
460,164
Hispanic ethnicity vari**Results are significant beyond the .001 level.
*Results are significant beyond the .01 level.
able does not filter out all
characteristic such as an individual’s level of educaof these effects.
tion, or years of work experience, etc.
Regarding the first hypothesis, the results
The adjusted R-squared values for the immishow that even after controlling for a number of
grant and native regressions are .188 and .145 respecworker characteristics and other human capital,
tively in 1980, and .249 and .178 respectively in
immigrants received lower rates of return to a college
1990. Of the control variables used – all of which
degree, to some college experience and to 12 years of
were significant and showing the predicted signs,
completed education in both years of observation.
with the exception of AgeMig – the most interesting
What is important to keep in mind is the method used
results came from Hispanic ethnicity (HISP). For
to determine the percentage changes in rates of return
having Hispanic ethnicity immigrants were hurt more
to these three levels of education. The omitted educathan natives in both years of observation. In 1980
tion group used for reference in the analysis consistimmigrants earned 12.8% less for having Hispanic
ed of workers with less than 12 years of education.
ethnicity while Hispanic natives earned only 10.3%
Therefore, any percentage change in the rates of
less. While the situation grew worse for Hispanic
return to the three education levels must also account
immigrants in 1990 – who earned 16.1% less than
for changes in the group’s rate of return to less than
non-Hispanic immigrants – it improved somewhat
12 years of education. That being said, in 1980 colfor Hispanic natives, who only suffered earnings
lege-educated immigrants earned only 52% more
loses of (roughly) 9.4%.
than immigrants that didn’t finish 12 years of school,
I put forward two explanations for these
while college-educated natives earned 73% more
results; both of which derive from the changes in the
than natives with less than 12 years. Natives with
national origins mix that followed the amendments
some college experience also earned 45% more than
made to US immigration policy in 1965. First, given
those with less than 12 years of education, and those
that the Hispanic portion of incoming immigrants
that at least completed 12 years of education earned
experienced growth between 1980 and 1990, it is
31% more than those who did not. Immigrants, on the
likely that by increasing competition with native
other hand, earned only 24% more for one to three
workers the larger number of Hispanic immigrants
years of college experience relative to their reference
increased the incidence of discrimination in the US
group, and a very low 13.4% more for finishing just
labor market. Such discrimination would translate
12 years of school.
empirically as greater immigrant loses to Hispanic
As hypothesized, these trends carried over to
ethnicity. Secondly, Borjas (1985, 1995, 1999) has
1990 at all three levels of education. The most
asserted that the economic conditions enticing indinotable case is the rate of return to a college degree,
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where natives earned an additional 94% and immigrants earned an additional 72.5%. From these results
it is clear that while natives had higher average levels
of education than immigrants over the 1980’s, they
also received significantly higher rates of return to
the same levels of education. The margin of difference between these rates of return makes this point
difficult to argue with. What remains open to speculation is what causes such differences at all three levels of education over the ten-year period of observation.
The most likely theories for why immigrant
rates of return to education are lower than native
returns are also the two most popular explanations
given for the relatively lower wages received by
immigrants since the late 1960’s. They focus on the
growing problems of English language deficiency
and the foreign attainment of a relatively lower-quality education than would be received in the US The
research design’s use of control measures for English
skills rules out language deficiency as a possible
cause. The language deficiency variables for immigrants are all highly significant, and their signs follow the predictions. Also their magnitudes follow a
logical order in both years of observation, and immigrant rates of return to education still trail behind
natives’ by a significant amount.
The theory that immigrants raised in some
less-developed countries receive education of a relatively lower quality is another explanation for relatively lower immigrant rates of return to education.
However, it is unlikely that this factor exerts enough
explanatory power to explain the entire margin of difference between immigrant and native rates of return
at all three levels of education. The main reason for
this can be taken directly from our results. Given that
so many of the immigrants arriving after 1970 were
Hispanic (in our data samples, 33.5% in 1980 and
43.6% in 1990), it is expected that the control variable used for Hispanic ethnicity filtered out a portion
of the negative wage effects resulting from the attainment of an education in a less-developed country.
This can be seen in the greater disparity between
immigrant and native rates of return to Hispanic ethnicity in 1990 than in 1980. Therefore, while the
quality differences in education between the US and
many of its less-developed source countries explain a
portion of the disparity seen in immigrant and native
rates of return to education, they cannot explain all of
the disparity.

Our second hypothesis suggested that rate-ofreturn growth between 1980 and 1990 was positive
for all three levels of education, but that it was greatest for those with a college degree. This hypothesis
was intended to separate the differences in rates of
return to education strictly by level of education as
opposed to our immigrant-native framework for comparison. This was done with the hope that our results
for growth in the returns to education would show
trends that might lend other explanations for
observed differences in the returns to education. As
expected, the results show that in 1990 both groups
experienced higher rates of return to all three levels
of education than in 1980. The most modest growth
occurred for the completion of 12 years of education,
where rates of return grew 9% for immigrants and
only 3.5% for natives.
Surprisingly, immigrants also experienced
11.6% greater returns to some college experience
while native returns grew by 10.3%. The result that
immigrant rates of return outgrew native returns to
both of these education levels was unexpected.
Considering the increase in average native education
levels over the 1980’s and the simultaneous influx of
immigrants originating in less-developed countries,
one would expect native returns to outgrow immigrant returns for both levels of education. The most
likely explanation for why this did not occur derives
from changes in the rate of return that each reference
(omitted) group experienced for having less than 12
years of education.
Since our estimates of the returns to 12 years
of education, some college experience, and a college
degree are measured relative to the omitted group, if
the immigrant rate of return to the completion of less
than 12 years of education declined over the 1980’s,
our results would show inflated growth in their
returns to the other three levels of education.
Therefore, it is likely that these larger immigrant
growth rates in the returns to some college experience
and to the completion of 12 year of education are
partly explained by the greater difficulty had by lesseducated immigrants in the US labor market over the
1980’s.
As the theoretical framework established –
and as the literature suggests – the largest rate-ofreturn increase occurred for workers with a college
degree. To this education level immigrants and
natives experienced 20.6% and 21% higher rates of
return respectively in 1990 than in 1980. Before
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exploring changes in the supply of college-educated
labor, it is worth noticing two things about these
growth rates in immigrant and native returns to a college degree; both in their relation to each other and in
their relation to observed growth in the rates of return
to some college experience and to the completion of
12 years of education.
First of all, the similarity between them is
striking. Either such regularity is a coincidence, or
another causal force exerted similar power over both
immigrant and native rates of return to a college
degree over the 1980’s. Secondly, the large margin by
which these rates of return to a college degree outgrew the rates of return to the respective lower levels
of education for immigrants and natives supports the
observation made in much of the literature (Levy et al
1992, Bartel et al 1987, Berman et al 1994) that the
returns to higher skills (college education) increased
more than did the returns to lower skills (high school
education) over the 1980’s.
Now, concerning changes in the supply of
college-educated labor, Table 1 (p.7) shows that the
two largest age groups (25-34 and 35-44) in the college-educated, male labor force experienced increases of 32% and a staggering 102% between 1979 and
1987 compared to the previous decade. As was mentioned in section II, the simultaneous increase in the
employment shares and wage rates of a group of
workers suggests a growing demand for the labor
provided by that particular group. Therefore, it is possible that the rate-of-return growth for a college education experienced by natives and immigrants is at
least partially caused by increased relative demand
for skilled labor over the 1980’s.
In sum, while the regression results may have
turned up more questions than answers regarding
what drives the observed differences in immigrant
and native rates of return to education, they do give
us a few strong conclusions. The confirmation of our
first hypothesis lends support to two major claims.
First, and without question, immigrant workers
received much lower rates of return to all three levels
of education relative to natives in 1980 and 1990.
Secondly, the measures of control taken in the
research design and the nature of the results suggest
that neither English language deficiency nor “lessdeveloped” education can explain all of the lower
rates of return experienced by immigrants. The
results verifying our second hypothesis accommodate
the possibility that at least part of the observed rate76

of-return growth for a college degree experienced by
both groups in the 1980’s resulted from the increased
demand for skilled labor.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our results have shown that immigrants experienced much lower returns to the same levels of education than natives. Since the interpretation of these
rates of return is where the real argument lies, we
appealed to traditional explanations that fix the analytical focus on the skills and characteristics that
immigrants bring to the US labor market. While these
accounts are a vital assessment of immigrant labor –
one that has revealed determinants of poor immigrant
performance such as English language deficiency and
education levels of relatively lower quality and quantity – a fuller analysis must also take stock of the
labor market conditions in which immigrants are
being rewarded for their skills. We were able to show
that the rate of return to a college degree for each
group could have been driven up over the ten year
period by greater labor demand for skills in spite of
tremendous concurrent growth in the supply of college-educated workers. This possibility suggests that
labor market conditions have a significant effect on
the rewards received by immigrants and natives for
certain levels of education.
A direct implication of the rate-of-return
analysis in this paper is that traditional explanations
for the poor labor market performance of immigrants
cannot account for all of these observed differences
in education reward structures. Further research
should focus on the relative quality of education
received in the US and in some of its less-developed
source countries. Some form of estimate of differential education quality would allow the measurement
of the amount of responsibility that a foreign education of lower “relative quality” should assume for the
lower relative rates of return that immigrants experienced at all levels of education. Furthermore, given
that a lower quality education characterized the
human capital stock of many incoming immigrants
after the 1970’s, it is an implication of this paper that
future amendments to immigration policy should
consider either shifting admittance criteria more
towards educational attainment and work-related
skills or implementing post-arrival education programs targeted at immigrants.
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APPENDIX A
Industry Groups by Nature of Production
Goods Sector
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Construction and Mining
Manufacturing (durable and nondurable goods)
Service Sector
Transportation, Communication and other Utilities
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Business and Repair Services
Personal Services
Entertainment and Recreation Services
(10) Professional and Related Services
(11) Public Administration
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